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ABSTRACT
JOHN PHILLIPS: Instrumental Justification of Epistemic Coherence Requirements.
(Under the direction of Matthew Kotzen)
Why think that our doxastic states should obey norms of formal coherence? One
sort of answer to this question attempts to justify coherence in instrumental terms, arguing
that only by being coherent can we achieve some more fundamental goal, such as true
belief. Here I consider apparent counterexamples to this instrumental strategy: cases in
which being incoherent seems like the best way of achieving epistemic goals. Although the
cases differ considerably in their surface structure, I provide a common diagnosis, claiming
that the cases implicitly depend on contentious assumptions about the range of possible
states that count as relevant alternatives to be considered in pursuing our epistemic goals.
I suggest that, by substituting a range of such states that is independently better motivated,
we may preserve the viability of the instrumental strategy.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two claims:
TB: One ought to believe as many truths, and as few falsehoods, as possible.
NC: For any proposition p, one ought not simultaneously believe p and ¬p.
Each of these claims expresses a candidate epistemic norm, a proposal about how
an agent’s doxastic attitudes must be in so far as she is to count as epistemically rational.
Perhaps neither is obviously correct; TB in particular is clearly in need of greater specificity
(how, for instance, is one to trade off between the dual demands of believing truths and
avoiding believing falsehoods?). But each, I think, has at least a certain ring of plausibility
to it, a sense that if we haven’t yet stated things in quite the proper way, we’re at least on
the right path.
In certain cases, TB and NC conflict; in order to satisfy one, you must violate the other.
Simply imagine any case in which your holding a pair of contradictory beliefs results in
your acquiring (only) a great many new true beliefs, or losing (only) a great many false
ones. Some such cases are simple but whimsical: a mad scientist offers to dose you with
a drug that will greatly increase your deductive powers, on the condition that his brain
scanning machine detects in you simultaneous beliefs that seven is a prime number, and
that it is not. Other cases are more realistic but also require more detailed exposition; I will
present some examples later. In such cases, there are a number of interesting questions that
can be asked: is it possible for you to come to believe a contradiction? Is it prudent to do
so? Is it morally permissible? But we can also ask distinctively epistemic questions: is it
epistemically rational for you to hold the contradictory beliefs, violating NC? Is it rational
not to, thereby violating TB? Both? Neither?
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At this point, you might reasonably question the import of a conflict between two
candidate norms. After all, they are (for all that has been said, anyway) only candidate
norms; the fact that they conflict might simply be evidence that at least one of them is
incorrect, and that their intuitive plausibility is at best a reason to seek related alternatives
that do not conflict. And even if we are convinced that NC and TB are genuine epistemic
norms — well, norms sometimes conflict. We could still try to figure out an appropriate
response to such situations, or simply hope that we ourselves are lucky enough to avoid
such perplexing circumstances.
I think, though, that such a response does not do justice to the importance of this
conflict. TB and NC were not picked at random; instead, they are representative of two
broader categories of candidate norms, what I will refer to as ‘goal norms’ and ‘coherence
requirements’ respectively. I will discuss these categories at length in Section I, below.
The conflict sketched above is not specific to TB and NC, but arises for a great many
combinations of a goal norm and a coherence requirement. Such conflict poses a challenge
to an otherwise promising (though certainly not the only) strategy both for accounting
for the apparent normative force of coherence requirements, and for figuring out which
coherence requirements in fact hold. This strategy, which I will term the ‘Instrumental
Thesis,’ suggests that coherence requirements hold in virtue of their status as a means to
the end of conforming to goal norms. This thesis, if true, can be used to explain, of a given
coherence requirement that we are convinced holds, why we ought to follow it: in order to
achieve the end represented by some goal norm. Or the thesis can be used, given a goal
norm, to figure out what coherence requirements must hold— we must simply figure out
which coherence requirements serve as effective means to the end of conforming to the
goal norm.
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The challenge, in short, is this: whatever epistemic coherence requirements in fact
hold, they seemingly hold unconditionally.1 Intuitively, for instance, there is some re-
quirement that you are violating in holding contradictory beliefs, regardless of the circum-
stances. In particular, coherence requirements seem to hold whether or not they are effec-
tive means, in a given instance, of satisfying a goal norm. If it is true that for any goal norm
and any coherence requirement there are cases where they conflict, then there are cases
where the coherence requirement is not an effective means of achieving the goal norm. If
the coherence requirement derived its normative force from its status as an effective means,
then we would expect it not to hold in these cases of conflict. But then it is would be false
that the coherence requirement holds unconditionally. This might, of course, turn out to be
the right answer; intuitions to the contrary might be in error.
The main project of this paper will be to consider what may be said in favor of co-
herence requirements in light of this challenge. What resources might we draw on to resist
abandoning unconditional coherence requirements altogether? I will not defend a specific
positive argument for a particular coherence requirement, but will instead try to show where
in logical space such arguments may be found. While I give some consideration to the op-
tion of giving up the Instrumental Thesis in favor of alternative strategies of justification,
my main focus will be on means by which the Thesis itself may be preserved: in particular,
on the characteristics of goal norms that do not under any circumstances come into conflict
with the coherence requirements that they might be used to justify.
I will proceed as follows. In Section I, I will clarify the categories of ‘goal norms’ and
‘coherence requirements.’ In Section II, I will motivate the Instrumental Thesis, and show
how it has been used to argue for epistemic coherence requirements. In Section III, I will
present two cases of apparent conflict between coherence requirements and goal norms,
of the sort that pose a challenge for the Instrumental Thesis. Section IV will provide a
1Indeed, given the definition that I will offer below, a norm must hold unconditionally to count as a coherence
requirement at all, though of course a given coherence requirement may be closely related to a conditional
norm that otherwise restricts one’s doxastic states in similar manner.
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common diagnosis for these two cases, arguing that in each case the root of the conflict
lies in the interpretation of modal terms used in the goal norm, and offer a general account
of the conditions under which conflicts between coherence requirements and goal norms
can arise. Section V will consider the prospects for using the Instrumental Thesis to justify
coherence requirements in light of this general challenge. (Sections IV and V together
constitute the argumentative heart of the paper.) Finally, Section VI will consider the merits
of two alternative responses to the challenge: either denying the existence of unconditional
coherence requirements, or rejecting the Instrumental Thesis as an explanation of their
force.
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1 GOAL NORMS AND COHERENCE REQUIREMENTS
TB is one way of spelling out the adage that beliefs ‘aim at the truth,’ where that aim-
ing is taken to be a normative rather than a purely descriptive matter. TB picks out (when
relativized to an agent’s circumstances) a certain ideal set of beliefs: the set including as
many true beliefs and as few false ones as it is possible to hold under the circumstances.2
Of course the norm does not pick out this belief set under a sufficiently informative de-
scription to settle the question, from the perspective an actual agent, of which propositions
she should believe; it does not tell her which are true and which false. Thus, knowing that
she is subject to TB and intending to satisfy it does not ensure her success. The norm does,
however, establish the correct answers, and provide a standard against which her beliefs
can be objectively evaluated.
We can imagine altering TB in several ways while remaining consistent with its gen-
eral spirit. The norm might be supplemented so as to specify various ways in which the
sub-goal of maximizing true beliefs should be traded off against that of avoiding false be-
liefs, in non-ideal cases. For instance, we might specify that either holding true beliefs or
avoiding error takes lexical priority over the other, or that the acceptable expected ‘cost’
of acquiring a true belief is some particular number of false beliefs, or that acquiring true
beliefs about certain particularly important topics is worth taking on false beliefs about less
significant issues.
TB might instead be modified so as to pick out a different set of ideal beliefs, perhaps
one not specified in terms of truth and falsehood; say, the set of beliefs best supported by
2How we are to understand just which belief sets count as ‘possible to hold under the circumstances’ will turn
out to be a pivotal question. As this statement of TB is open to multiple readings, it can be more precisely
understood as representing a family of closely related goal norms. At this stage, however, my aim is to
demonstrate the structure of goal norms, not to identify the best version of TB.
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one’s current body of evidence. (Note that asserting this norm is quite different from simply
pointing out that a rational agent attempting to satisfy TB will make use of her evidence
to do so, and that her ability to come to true beliefs will depend on what evidence she
has available. The evidential norm in question states that a rational agent ought to believe
what is supported by her evidence, even if what is supported by her evidence is also false;
and she may fail to perfectly satisfy it if she reaches conclusions that are not in fact best
supported by her evidence, even if they are in fact true.)
Or again we might suggest norms analogous to TB, but applying to doxastic attitudes
other than full belief. A prominent example is the accuracy norm for credences (discussed
in greater detail in Section II), but perhaps there are also plausible analogs for comparative
confidences, suppositions, and so forth. A goal norm might consist of a conjunction of such
claims, for instance the conjunction of TB for beliefs and an accuracy norm for credences.
All of the norms resulting from these alterations (applied in any combination) would
be what I’ll refer to as ‘goal norms.’ A goal norm in the sense used here is distinguished by
the fact that it specifies a certain ideal state, or set thereof, that an agent ought, as a matter
of epistemic rationality, to strive to come as close to occupying (one of) as possible. Goal
norms are expressible as conditionals (or conjunctions thereof) with the ‘ought’ taking nar-
row scope. For instance, TB can be expressed as follows:
For any belief set B, if B is the belief set containing as many true beliefs and
as few false beliefs as it is possible for one to believe, then one ought to hold
B.
(Again, TB must be specified more precisely in order to establish a fact of the matter about
which belief set satisfies the antecedent of this conditional).
There’s a point worth briefly dwelling on here for the sake of clarity. A goal norm
may stipulate its ideal state solely in terms of the intrinsic features of an agent’s doxastic
attitudes. However, many examples, including TB, don’t work like that. The contents of
the ideal belief set picked out by TB depends on which propositions are true and which are
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false, that is, on facts about the world; whether one has satisfied TB depends both on one’s
doxastic attitudes, and on those worldly facts. Thus, in contrast to the coherence norms
addressed below, many goal norms are extrinsic in the sense that no doxastic state that an
agent can occupy is in itself sufficient to guarantee that they conform to a given goal norm;
rather, that doxastic state must bear an appropriate relation to the relevant facts. Satisfying
these norms looks different depending on the features of the world that one is in.
A natural way of understanding goal norms is in terms of epistemic value. For in-
stance, we might understand TB as specifying sources of positive (true beliefs) and neg-
ative (false beliefs) epistemic value, and requiring that rational agents adopt the doxastic
state with as much total epistemic value as possible. Other goal norms might be spelled out
not in terms of maximizing value, but rather of achieving sufficient value, or of avoiding
value dominance. In many contexts, such talk of epistemic value will be equivalent to talk
of goal norms as presented in the previous paragraph. However, I do not mean to assume
that the value involved in a genuine goal norm must necessarily be the only sort of epis-
temic value, or that satisfying goal norms must be the only source of epistemic value; the
formulation of goal norms in terms of ideal states is meant to avoid this suggestion.
NC is a very different sort of norm from TB. It is an example of what I will refer to
as ‘coherence requirements’. Coherence requirements make claims about the patterns that
should or should not hold among an agent’s doxastic attitudes, rather than about whether
any particular attitudes should or should not be held. One feature of coherence require-
ments, then, is that that they can be stated as conditionals (or conjunctions thereof) with the
‘ought’ taking a wide scope (albeit sometimes at the expense of standard English grammar).
For instance, NC was stated at the outset of the paper as follows:
For any proposition p, one ought not simultaneously believe p and ¬p.
Here is the equivalent in wide-scope conditional form:
For any proposition p and time t, one ought (if one believes p at t, then one
does not believe ¬p at t), and one ought (if one believes ¬p at t, then one does
not believe p at t).
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This coherence requirement is distinct from the narrow-scope claim NC*:
NC*: For any proposition p and time t, if one believes p at t, then one ought
not believe ¬p at t, and if one believes ¬p at t, then one ought not believe p at
t.
One important difference is that the consequent of the conditional in NC* can be detached
via modus ponens; if one in fact believes p at t, then it follows from NC* that one ought
not believe ¬p at t, simpliciter (even though one is perhaps mistaken in believing p, and ¬p
is true, better supported by one’s evidence, etc.). In contrast, NC offers no guidance at all
about whether one ought to believe p or ¬p. It simply says not to believe them both at the
same time.
Not all wide-scope epistemic norms are coherence requirements. Coherence require-
ments speak in particular to patterns among one’s doxastic attitudes alone, in the sense that
the truth of both the antecedent and the consequent of each conditional in the conditional
form of a coherence requirement depend solely on what doxastic attitudes one has. There
are (at least possible) wide-scope epistemic norms that speak instead to the relationship
between one’s doxastic attitudes and other facts about the world; these involve conditionals
where only the consequent depends on one’s doxastic state. For instance, the following
might be an epistemic norm: one ought (if one sees a squirrel, then one believes there is a
squirrel present). This norm is wide-scope, and is defensible, but is not a coherence require-
ment: what doxastic attitudes one should have, in order to satisfy it, depend on whether or
not one actually sees a squirrel.3 Of course, the squirrel norm is not a goal norm either; goal
norms and coherence requirements are not meant to exhaust the space of logically possible
epistemic norms.
For purposes of this paper, I will be restricting my consideration to synchronic co-
herence requirements. Besides NC, examples of widely defended coherence requirements
include
3I am assuming a sense of ‘sees’ here that does not itself count as a doxastic attitude.
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Probabilism: One ought not assign a credence function that violates the ax-
ioms of probability.
and
Deductive Consistency: For any propositions p, q and r, if r is a logical con-
sequence of p and ¬r is a logical consequence of q, then one ought not simul-
taneously believe p and q.
Of course, many other coherence requirements are possible. I will focus my discus-
sion, in particular, on NC and Probabilism, but the main points generalize at least over
synchronic epistemic coherence requirements.
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2 THE INSTRUMENTAL THESIS
The Instrumental Thesis is a claim about the relationship between epistemic coherence
requirements and epistemic goal norms. According to the Thesis, any genuine coherence
requirement holds in virtue of the fact that satisfying the coherence requirement is a means
of bringing about the end of satisfying some genuine goal norm. The force of the coherence
requirement is therefore derivative of the force of the goal norm: you ought to satisfy the
former in order to satisfy the latter. This leaves open the question of whether the goal norm
is fundamental in an absolute sense, or whether it in turn holds in virtue of its relation to
some yet more fundamental norm or source of value; nonetheless I will speak of the more
fundamental norm in a means/end relationship as ‘fundamental.’
I noted at the beginning of Section I that TB is one way of making sense of the claim
that beliefs ‘aim at the truth.’ In general, goal norms that specify the ideal epistemic state
as depending both on one’s doxastic attitudes and on the truth values of the propositions
over which one is opinionated (alternatively, norms that take truth to constitute epistemic
value) have an easy time explaining the sense that, as believers, we are in the business of
trying to get at the truth. Of course, there can be considerations in favor of holding some
belief that have nothing to do with its truth. A belief may be prudentially, or morally, or
perhaps even aesthetically valuable. But one might think that epistemically speaking, facts
about what beliefs we ought to have trace back in some manner or other to facts about
which beliefs are true and which are false. Claims roughly along these lines are common
in the literature.4 William Alston, for instance, writes: “Epistemic evaluation is undertaken
from what we might call ‘the epistemic point of view.’ That point of view is defined by the
4See for instance David [2001], Alston [1985], Bonjour [1985].
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aim of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs . . . . For a belief
to be justified is for it, somehow, to be awarded high marks relative to that aim.”5 While
Alston puts the point in terms of justification, in the language of norms we can read him as
claiming that any norm governing beliefs that has nothing whatsoever to do with promoting
true belief should not be counted as an epistemic norm at all.
My purpose here is not to legislate the use of the term ‘epistemic.’ I will not argue
that applying that description to a norm that in no way involves promoting true belief, or
even promoting any particular relation between one’s doxastic state and the world, must
be mistaken. Still, whether or not what Alston gestures at is appropriately considered the
epistemic point of view, it is certainly an epistemic point of view, and a familiar, compelling
one at that. If we embrace a goal norm like TB, then we are firmly situated within this
familiar epistemic point of view. If we adopt a goal norm that differs too radically from
TB, then whether or not the point of view we thereby take still counts as an epistemic one,
we must consider whether the familiar point of view is one that we are willing to abandon.
What then to say about coherence requirements? Let us assume for the moment that
if coherence requirements like NC and Probabilism hold at all, they are epistemic norms.
If that’s so, and if we accept that epistemic norms must somehow be in the business of
promoting true belief, then we apparently are faced with a puzzle: how are NC and Prob-
abilism in the business of promoting the truth? Recall, neither one makes any mention of
truth at all. Indeed, I stipulated that coherence requirements, as I am using the term, are
satisfied (or not) based solely on facts about what doxastic attitudes one has. Apart from
perhaps a few tricky cases of beliefs about one’s own beliefs, this stipulation rules out the
possibility that whether a coherence requirement is satisfied depends directly on the truth
of one’s beliefs. Are we then forced to give up on the idea of genuine epistemic coherence
requirements altogether?
5Alston [1985], pp. 83-84.
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Well, no, or at any rate not yet. Coherence requirements might still hold if satisfying
them is a way of satisfying some more fundamental norm that is directly in the business of
promoting true beliefs? for instance, a goal norm like TB. More precisely, it might be the
case that whatever doxastic state one ought to adopt in order to satisfy some truth-related
goal norm, also has the property of satisfying some coherence requirement. In that case,
coherence requirements would have no independent normative force; it would not be the
case that one ought, for instance, to avoid holding contradictory beliefs simply for the sake
of avoiding contradiction. Instead, satisfying coherence norms would be of instrumental
importance.
One might, for instance, make the following simple argument in favor of NC:
1) TB holds: one ought to hold as many true beliefs and as few false beliefs as
possible
2) Holding beliefs that satisfy NC (that is, non-contradictory beliefs) tends to result
in holding more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs than does holding contradictory
beliefs
3) Therefore, holding beliefs that satisfy NC results in one’s also satisfying TB, while
holding beliefs that violate NC does not
Conclusion One ought to hold beliefs that satisfy NC
Now, (2) is not obviously true, and (3) does not obviously follow from (1) and (2). Indeed,
in Section III below I will criticize arguments of this sort. But I think that, if asked to ex-
plain why we think there’s something wrong with holding contradictory beliefs, many of us
might reply with something like this argument.6 After all, if we hold a pair of contradictory
beliefs, at least one of them is guaranteed to be false; so if true beliefs are what we’re after,
violating NC seems like a bad strategy.
6In the literature, Branden Fitelson, Kenny Easwaran and David McCarthy present an argument for NC that,
while significantly more sophisticated (for instance, relying on a dominance avoidance norm rather than TB)
roughly follows this pattern. See Fitelson, Easwaran and McCarthy [manuscript].
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A more prominent use of the Instrumental Thesis is James Joyce’s attempt to offer a
purely epistemic, rather than pragmatic, argument for Probabilism (the claim that one ought
not assign a credence function that violates the axioms of probability).7 Joyce endorses a
norm of truth for full beliefs along the lines of TB, and also endorses an analogous norm of
gradational accuracy for credence functions, requiring that “an epistemically rational agent
. . .must strive to hold a system of partial beliefs that, in her best judgment, is likely to have
an overall level of gradational accuracy at least as high as that of any alternative system she
might adopt.”8
Joyce does not give a precise definition of gradational accuracy, which can be loosely
characterized as the ‘closeness’ of one’s credence values to the truth values of the propo-
sitions to which they are assigned (for instance, a high credence in a true proposition is
more accurate than a low credence; a low credence in a false proposition is more accurate
than a high one). Instead, he applies a number of axioms to set bounds on what he takes
to be reasonable ways of measuring accuracy, and goes on to show that, for any of these
reasonable accuracy measures and any credence function that violates Probabilism, there
is another credence function that satisfies Probabilism that is more accurate (according to
the specified measure) regardless of the truth values of propositions about which one is
opinionated. Conclusion: one ought to satisfy Probabilism.
In my terms, Joyce endorses a goal norm of accuracy dominance-avoidance; proves
that satisfying a coherence norm, Probabilism, is an effective means of satisfying the goal
norm; and, by way of the Instrumental Thesis, concludes on that basis that one ought
to satisfy Probabilism. The genius of his approach is that while satisfying Probabilism
depends only on one’s doxastic states, and accuracy depends both on one’s doxastic states
and the truth values of the propositions to which one assigns credences, Joyce seems to
be able to show that having one’s doxastic states arranged according to a certain pattern
7Joyce [1998], [2009]. See also Leitgeb & Pettigrew [2010 a,b] for an alternative attempt to derive Probabil-
ism from accuracy norms.
8Joyce [1998].
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always gets them closer to the truth, whatever the truth happens to be. Even if you don’t
know what the truth values are, and so cannot go about satisfying the goal norm directly,
you can make progress by satisfying the coherence requirement.
Various objections to Joyce’s argument are possible. Some are outside the scope of
this paper; my purpose, after all, is not to determine whether Probabilism holds or not.
Rather, I aim to figure out whether the relationship that Joyce claims to show between
accuracy dominance-avoidance and Probabilism is the right sort of relationship to account
for Probabilism’s normative force, and relatedly, whether Joyce’s argument is the right sort
of argument to establish that Probabilism holds, if in fact it does. Certain objections to
Joyce’s argument are highly relevant to those questions, and will I turn to them in the next
section.
I have not clearly stated just what sort of means-end relation must hold between, on
the one hand, the doxastic states satisfying a coherence requirement, and on the other, a
goal norm, in order for the Instrumental Thesis to apply to that coherence requirement-goal
norm pair. I have not said, for instance, whether satisfying the coherence requirement must
be a sufficient condition for satisfying the goal norm, a necessary condition, or both. When
the Thesis is used to account for the force of an unconditional coherence requirement, that
is, one that applies in any possible circumstances, then it must be the case that in any
possible circumstances, if one does not satisfy the coherence requirement, then one also
does not satisfy the goal norm.9 So the Thesis will not offer a satisfactory explanation
if adopting a coherent state is a merely sufficient condition for satisfying the goal norm,
but there are incoherent states that would work just as well. On the other hand, it doesn’t
9One might try to argue here that, on analogy with rule utilitarianism in ethics, that because satisfying a
coherence requirement leads to satisfying a genuine goal norm for the most part, one should satisfy the
coherence requirement even in cases of foreseeable conflict. I am admittedly unsympathetic to rule utilitarian
approaches. However, I would suggest that the best version of such an argument, rather than claiming that (for
instance) TB unconditionally establishes the force of NC, instead adopts an alternative goal norm along the
following lines: “One ought to satisfy those requirements that, for the most part, result in. . . .” The structure
of the instrumental relation is then as specified here. Section IV demonstrates the means of arriving at a case
of conflict between even this ‘rule utilitarian’ goal norm and NC, though the considerations raised in Section
VI suggest that such a conflict, occurring as it would only under very unusual circumstances, might not be
such a great problem for our ordinary conviction in NC after all.
14
appear that in any given circumstances there must be some particular coherent state such
that the adoption of that particular state is a necessary condition for satisfying the goal
norm (the coherence requirement is vindicated if there are several ways of satisfying the
goal norm, but all are coherent), nor yet that it must be the case that every single coherent
state is sufficient to satisfy the goal norm.10
I would suggest, then, that the Instrumental Thesis succeeds for a given pair of a
goal norm and a coherence requirement if, in any possible circumstances, there is at least
one coherent state (that is, a state that satisfies the coherence requirement in question)
the adoption of which is sufficient to ensure the satisfaction of the goal norm, and it is
necessary that one adopt some coherent state or other. (Of course, this claim will only hold
if circumstances are individuated in a sufficiently fine-grained manner as to settle which
states satisfy the goal norm; so the possible circumstances at issue here must normally
be understood as settling, at least, the truth values of propositions over which an agent is
opinionated.)
Accepting this suggestion, however, is not strictly necessary for the purposes of my
argument. The cases I will consider as challenges to the Instrumental Thesis involve cir-
cumstances in which it appears that only incoherent states are sufficient means to satisfying
the goal norm. Thus even if one held that the coherence requirements could be validated be
a version of the Instrumental Thesis requiring only that in all possible circumstances some
coherent state be among the sufficient means for satisfying the goal norm, the challenges
will still apply. Similarly, they would apply if satisfying a coherence norm need only in-
crease the chance of one’s satisfying the goal norm, in cases where whether or not doing so
10Kolodny [2007] argues that if there are any consistent belief sets that do promote true belief — that is, if
there are any coherent states the adoption of which is not sufficient to satisfy the goal norm — then NC is
not a genuine requirement. I disagree; I think a requirement can be genuine if one always ought to satisfy it,
even if there are certain ways of satisfying it that are unacceptable. This is in part a terminological dispute,
however, and I am largely sympathetic to the spirit of Kolodny’s suggestion, as he goes on to try to work out
what I would call an instrumental argument for NC and he calls an error theory. My goal here is in large part
to describe the general conditions under which it is possible to show that, in order to satisfy a goal norm, one
always ought to act in accordance with a coherence requirement, whether or not this is taken to establish the
existence of the coherence requirement itself.
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is a matter of objective chance.
16
3 A CHALLENGE TO THE INSTRUMENTAL THESIS: TWO CASES
This section will focus on a pair of cases that poses a prima facie challenge to the
plausibility of applying the Instrumental Thesis to particular coherence requirements: the
case of the mad scientist first mentioned in the introduction, and Michael Caie’s objection
to Joyce’s argument for Probabilism. Each case works by describing circumstances in
which violating a coherence requirement is the only way satisfying the goal norm from
which it might have been thought to derive its force. These cases therefore present us
with a trilemma: we must either adopt a different (and perhaps less plausible) goal norm;
reject the coherence requirement in question, at least in its unconditional form; or deny
that the Instrumental Thesis applies. In the next section, I will then identify the common
mechanism at work in each case’s challenge to the Thesis, and consider the extent to which
those challenges can be generalized to apply to other pairs of goal norms and coherence
requirements.
I provided one example of a conflict between a coherence requirement and a goal norm
(namely, NC and TB) in the introduction: the example of the mad scientist who offers to
improve your deductive powers, leading to many new true beliefs and/or correction of false
beliefs, if only you can demonstrate to him that you hold contradictory simultaneous beliefs
about whether seven is a prime.11 Such a case presents a prima facie challenge to any
attempt to use TB and the Instrumental Thesis to explain the force of NC, along the lines
of the simple argument sketched in Section I.12 That argument suggested that satisfying
11The case is inspired by an example originally due to Roderick Firth [1981], as related, and given illuminating
discussion, in Berker [2013]. Firth’s case does not explicitly deal with coherence requirements, though it does
challenge the plausibility of norms like TB. Other similar cases can be found in Greaves [2013].
12This simple version of the case is appropriate to the simplicity of TB. As we will see, the case can be
modified to apply to more nuanced goal norms. For instance, if one’s preferred truth norm weighs true beliefs
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NC is important because doing so results in holding more true beliefs and fewer false ones.
Yet it looks like, in the mad scientist case, there is a possible incoherent state that includes
more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs than any state that one can achieve by remaining
coherent; namely the state that results from holding contradictory beliefs about the number
seven, and thereby earning the mad scientist’s reward. The challenge to the Instrumental
Thesis claims that in this case, the ideal state picked out by TB is therefore an NC-violating
one, and so in order to satisfy TB it is necessary to violate NC. But then it cannot be the
case that NC stands in an appropriate instrumental relation to TB in every case, and so TB
cannot explain the force of NC by way of the Instrumental Thesis.
Each horn of the trilemma suggests a possible response to this case. Perhaps NC really
serves to promote a goal norm other than TB, and we should simply reject TB in favor of
this alternative. (If cases like the mad scientist arose only for TB, this would be an obvious
choice; the problem will be made more threatening once it becomes clear how many goal
norms such cases threaten.) Perhaps in the mad scientist case holding contradictory beliefs
is indeed the rational thing to do, and we should reject the unconditional NC (while still
perhaps maintaining that avoiding contradiction is a good idea most of the time). Or per-
haps both TB and NC hold, but NC does not derive its force through a means/end relation
with TB.
The mad scientist case has various features that might lead to its being dismissed
as a valid counterexample to the Instrumental Thesis as applied to TB and NC. In the
mad scientist case, one’s contradictory beliefs causally bring about the satisfaction of TB.
Perhaps the means/end relationship involved in the best version of the Instrumental Thesis
is a non-causal one. In the mad scientist case, one is enticed to hold contradictory beliefs
about one topic (whether seven is a prime number) in order bring about improvements in
one’s deductive faculties, and thereby, true beliefs that will at least for the most part have
about some subjects more heavily than others, the mad scientist could offer the ability to deduce true beliefs
about the very most important subjects. This point will be addressed in more detail in Section IV; for now,
I only ask that readers not dismiss the case merely on the grounds that they are too sophisticated to have
accepted TB in the first place.
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nothing to do with numbers at all. Perhaps the most promising version of the Instrumental
Thesis does not warrant this sort of trade-off, but does permit holding contradictory beliefs
about a (perhaps quite specific) topic in order to promote truth in one’s beliefs about that
very topic. Finally, in the mad scientist case, any epistemic success that one achieves as
a result of believing a contradiction comes about via an improvement in one’s deductive
capacities — but it might be argued that the demands of epistemic rationality include the
demand that one carry out excellent or even perfect deduction.13 So perhaps what epistemic
rationality requires in this case is neither that you believe a contradiction, nor that you
remain ignorant of the truths that improved deductive capacities might deliver; rather, it is
that you satisfy NC while also arriving at the correct deductive conclusions.
As it turns out, none of these problematic features of the mad scientist case is necessary
in order to generate the sort of conflict that can be used to challenge the Instrumental
Thesis. Let us turn to an example that does not trade on a causal relationship between
means and end, nor on a tradeoff between beliefs on different topics, nor on a dilemma
that one could avoid by satisfying other plausible rational requirements. This case was
proposed by Michael Caie [2013] as the centerpiece of his objection to Joyce’s argument
for Probabilism.
Recall the structure of Joyce’s argument: one ought to satisfy Probabilism because,
whatever the truth values of the world may be, doing so is an effective means to satisfying
the goal norm of accuracy dominance-avoidance. What exactly does that goal norm amount
to? Joyce spells out the norm as follows:
ADA: One ought to assign a credence function c such that there does not exist
any possible alternative function, c⇤, over the same set of propositions, that is
more accurate than c in every possible world.
13There are possible variants of the mad scientist case in which the mechanism through which the scientist
offers his rewards is not an improvement in your mental capacities; he might instead, for instance, offer
a great deal of new evidence from which you are able to deduce new truths. I will initially focus on the
deductive-capacity version for expositional purposes, as it more clearly invites possible responses that I wish
to consider; however, I will address a new-evidence version of the case in Section V.
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Joyce provides an intricate proof that, if one assigns a function that satisfies Probabil-
ism, then one also satisfies ADA; and that if one assigns a function that violates Probabil-
ism, then one also violates ADA (that is, there does exist some alternative function that is
more accurate in every world).14 And on the face of it, this looks like a pretty good case for
satisfying Probabilism. It’s easy enough to feel the force of the intuition that it is a mistake
to hold credence function c if some alternative, c⇤, is guaranteed to be more accurate.
Caie argues, however, that we should not be so quick to embrace Probabilism; in
fact, he claims, there are cases (albeit somewhat odd ones) in which it is epistemically
rational to violate Probabilism. His central case is that of self-referential propositions like
the following, designated P :
(P ): John currently assigns to P a credence less than or equal to .5
Now, at any given time, P is either true or false. If I assign a credence less than or
equal to .5 to P , then P is true (supposing I am the John referred to), while if I assign
a credence greater than .5, or fail to assign any credence at all, then it is false. Suppose,
for simplicity’s sake, that my credence function assigns values to only two propositions,
P and ¬P . Joyce’s result tells us that if I assign credences that satisfy Probabilism (and
that therefore my credences in P and ¬P sum to 1) then there is no Probabilism-violating
credence function that is more accurate in every possible world; if I assign credences that
violate Probabilism, then there must be some Probabilism-satisfying function guaranteed
to be more accurate (though which it is depends on the choice of scoring rule).
In particular, suppose I assign the following Probabilism-satisfying function C:
C(P ) = .5
C(¬P ) = .5
Then (given the content of P ) we can conclude that P must be true (since I assign
a credence less than or equal to .5) while ¬P must be false; my credence assignment,
14The details of Joyce’s proof are not essential here, as neither Caie nor I calls into question the link between
Probabilism and ADA.
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therefore, is not particularly accurate. Now Joyce is perfectly correct that C satisfies ADA;
there is no Probabilism-violating function that is more accurate than C regardless of the
truth values of P and ¬P . Any such function that is more accurate (given a plausible
scoring rule) than C when P is true, must be less accurate than C, according to that same
scoring rule, when P is false. But Caie’s crucial insight is that, so long as I assign function
C, P cannot be false. P is false only when I assign either a credence greater than .5 to P ,
or assign no credence to it at all. But both of these states of affairs are inconsistent with my
assigning C.15
Here then is a Probabilism-violating function that, so long as I assign it, is certain to
be more accurate than C:
C⇤(P ) = .5
C⇤(¬P ) = 1
C⇤(P ) is, of course, equal to C(P ). On the other hand, C⇤(¬P ), unlike C(P ), is
perfectly accurate whenever I assign C⇤(P ); assigning C⇤(P ) guarantees that ¬P is true,
and C⇤(P ) assigns a credence of 1 to it. It follows that C⇤(P ) is more accurate than C
according to any scoring rule with the following property:
If any two credence functions c and c⇤ assign the same values to all propositions
other than p, and c⇤ assigns a higher value to p, then c⇤ is more accurate than c
at any world in which p is true and less accurate than c at any world in which
p is false.
But Joyce requires that all his candidate scoring rules have this property.16 And so, at
any world where ¬P is false (and in particular, any world where I assign either C or C⇤),
C⇤ is more accurate.
Of course, Joyce is not committed to the claim that C must, in virtue of satisfying
Probabilism, be more accurate than C⇤ in every possible world. Instead, his argument
15Caie takes himself here to be applying a familiar principle from practical decision theory: roughly, dom-
inance reasoning is only properly applied so long as acts and states are independent, in the sense that an
agent’s choice of act does not affect the expected outcome of the act.
16See for comparison the Dominance axiom in Joyce [1998], p. 593.
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establishes only there is some single Probabilism-satisfying function that is more accurate
than C⇤ in every possible world, and that there is no Probabilism-violating function that
is more accurate than C in every possible world. But consider what it would take for any
credence function to be more accurate than C⇤ in a world where, as in all the cases we’ve
been considering, P is true and ¬P is false. Coming up with such a function is not difficult:
C⇤⇤(P ) = 1
C⇤⇤(¬P ) = 0
C⇤⇤ is, in fact, perfectly accurate at such a world: the credences it assigns perfectly
match the truth values. But if I, the ‘John’ referred to in P , were to assign C⇤⇤, then I
would no longer be in such a world. Given the content of P , it would then be the case that
P would be false and ¬P would be true — and so C⇤⇤ would be perfectly inaccurate. My
assigning any particular credence to P has the potential to change P ’s truth value. And so
while C⇤⇤ may be an excellent choice for other agents who are concerned with promoting
their accuracy, in so far as I want to promote my accuracy it’s a terrible choice for me.
As it turns out, my adopting C⇤ results in a better accuracy score for me than does
adopting any Probabilism-satisfying function. And it does so foreseeably; the superior
accuracy of C⇤ does not rest, for instance, on empirical facts that I might or might not be
in a position to know. As long as I understand the content of P , I am in a position to be
certain of what accuracy score I will receive, on any given measure, for any function over
P and ¬P that I might adopt.17
None of this in any way challenges the claim that I will satisfy ADA iff I adopt a
Probabilism-satisfying function. But it does show that only by adopting a Probabilism-
violating function can I satisfy the following alternative goal norm:
CADA: One ought to assign a credence function c such that there does not exist
17Of course, actually being certain of what accuracy score I will receive requires being opinionated about
propositions other than P and ¬P . Understanding the content of P arguably does as well. C and C⇤ may
unproblematically be extended to include the required credences, or supplemented with alternative doxastic
states such as full beliefs, as long as the same changes are made in each case.
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any alternative function, c⇤, over the same set of propositions, the assignment
of which is guaranteed to result in better accuracy than the assignment of c.
Although Caie himself does not put his challenge to Joyce in quite these terms, we
may understand him as arguing as follows.18 The plausibility of ADA as a goal norm
is a result of conflating it with CADA. On learning that Probabilism-satisfying credence
functions satisfy ADA, we imagine that so long as we satisfy Probabilism, while we don’t
rule out the possibility that some alternative credence function is in fact more accurate than
ours, we do at least rule out the possibility that some alternative credence function that we
might adopt is guaranteed to be more accurate. It seems plausible that adopting a credence
function when there is a guaranteed more accurate alternative available constitutes a failure
of rationality, and so ADA strikes us as a reasonable epistemic goal norm. But in fact,
ruling out that sort of guaranteed-better-alternative requires satisfying CADA, not ADA.
And far from satisfying Probabilism’s being a foreseeably effective means of satisfying
CADA, there are circumstances in which violating Probabilism is necessary in order to
satisfy CADA.
Our predicament then is this: satisfying a particular coherence requirement, Probabil-
ism, is always a means to satisfying one candidate goal norm, ADA. But it isn’t clear why
we should care about satisfying ADA, at least once we clarify how it differs from CADA;
doing so doesn’t seem obviously to be constitutive of being an ideally epistemically rational
agent, nor does it seem like a goal we’re committed to qua believers. CADA, in contrast, is
an intuitively plausible goal norm, in that asserting it seems like a plausible way of spelling
out the familiar epistemic evaluative point of view. But while in many circumstances satis-
fying CADA requires satisfying Probabilism, in some cases it foreseeably requires violat-
ing Probabilism instead. We return to our trilemma. We may insist that, despite its flaws,
ADA and not CADA is the correct goal norm, and thereby preserve Probabilism; we may
18For a similar reading, see Carr [unpublished].
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abandon ADA in favor of CADA while insisting on the Instrumental Thesis, losing Prob-
abilism in the process; or we may hold on to both Probabilism and CADA, but deny that
Probabilism derives its force from CADA via the Instrumental Thesis.
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4 GENERALIZING THE CASES: THE POSSIBILITY PROBLEM
The previous section presented prima facie challenges to two potential applications of
the Instrumental Thesis. The mad scientist case challenges the Thesis’s ability to account
for NC in terms of TB. Caie’s case similarly challenges the Thesis’s ability to account
for Probabilism in terms of CADA; and, since Caie sees CADA as the most plausible
accuracy dominance avoidance norm, the case challenges by extension accuracy dominance
arguments for Probabilism generally. As things stand we face a trilemma, and we have yet
to consider the merits of each horn. Before doing so, however, it is worth trying to figure
out the essential features of each of these cases, those which drive their ability to challenge
the Instrumental Thesis. Doing so serves two purposes. First, it will shed light on the
generality of the challenge, and so on the range of additional applications of the Thesis that
we might expect to run into similar problems. Second, it will help us figure out what an
adequate response to the challenge must look like.
Let’s begin by considering just the mad scientist case. In particular, for simplicity’s
sake, take a version of the mad scientist case in which whether or not one believes a con-
tradiction, and thereby earns the scientist’s reward, does not affect the truth values of any
of the propositions over which one is opinionated.19 The mad scientist case is supposed to
be one in which TB and NC conflict, because accepting the scientist’s offer (and thereby
violating NC) results in holding more true and fewer false beliefs than any other possible
belief set. TB tells one to adopt the belief set that maximizes true belief and minimizes false
belief, from among the possible options. Notice: the mad scientist case works only if the
19Mad scientist cases may of course be described in such a way that the relevant truth values do depend on
one’s doxastic state. However, no such effect is essential to the challenge they pose to the Instrumental Thesis;
in contrast, it is essential to the Caie-like cases discussed below, and so I will delay discussion of this effect
and consider it in the context of those cases.
25
belief set resulting from violating NC is possible, and any alternative belief set containing
more truths or fewer falsehoods is not possible.
Independently, each of these claims might seem plausible. Despite whatever psycho-
logical barriers there might be to believing a contradiction, there is a sense in which doing
so is possible; at the least, it’s metaphysically possible, and we can evaluate counterfactu-
als with antecedents like “If I believed that seven is prime and that it is not . . . .” On the
other hand, there is a sense in which adopting a belief set containing more truths and fewer
falsehoods than that offered to me by the scientist is impossible; as stipulated in the case,
any such belief set is not one that I’m capable of reasoning to, given my actual evidence
and actual mental abilities. The crucial point, however, is this: neither of these senses of
‘possible,’ these forms of modality, both counts the set resulting from the scientist’s offer
(which I can’t reason my way to, given my actual limitations) as possible, and counts all
sets containing more true and fewer false beliefs (for instance, the metaphysically possible
belief set excluding the belief that seven is not a prime, but otherwise identical to the set
resulting from the scientist’s offer) as impossible. If we are presented with an argument that
purports to justify NC in virtue of a version of TB that employs metaphysical possibility
(for instance), then whatever the argument’s independent merits, a mad scientist case can-
not serve as a counterexample: while the belief set resulting from accepting the scientist’s
offer will count as possible, so will the belief set that includes all and only the truths, and
so obviously the mad scientist’s set will not be the best among the possible options. The
mad scientist can’t offer you anything better than the best metaphysically possible option.
If instead a sense of ‘possible’ is used that applies only to belief sets that I am capable of
reasoning my way to given my actual mental capacities, then while no option better than
the scientist’s offered belief set is possible, that every set isn’t possible either.
We might then more appropriately describe TB not as a goal norm, but rather as a
family of closely related goal norms. We can think of a fully specified version of TB
as having two components that work together to pick out the belief set that one ought to
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adopt. First, TB provides a preference ordering among (broadly logically possible) belief
sets, according to the number of true and false beliefs that they include; sets with more true
and fewer false beliefs rank higher. Second, a particular version of TB must specify the set
of ‘possible’ belief sets, such that one ought to adopt whichever belief set from that set of
sets ranks highest in the preference ordering. So when we wish to give TB definite content,
we must specify what kind of modality is invoked by the use of ‘possible’ in the norm.20
And many ways of so specifying TB will result in the verdict that, in the mad scientist
example, TB and NC do not conflict, for they conflict only given a sense of ‘possible’ that
rules in the scientist’s offer but rules out the otherwise preferable alternatives. Of course,
there are kinds of modality that will do the trick, and treat mad scientist cases as genuine
instances of TB-NC conflict. If nothing else, we can specify a sense of ‘possible’ in an
extensional manner, explicitly stipulating the possibility or impossibility of each belief set
to ensure that we end up with a conflict; in so doing, we will be identifying a version of TB
that cannot be used, along with the Instrumental Thesis, to justify NC. But insofar as we
are interested in whether NC is in fact validated by a genuine goal norm, the mere fact that
there exists some candidate, involving a contorted sense of possibility, that fails to validate
it is not particularly worrisome. If someone wished to use the mad scientist case alone to
show that no genuine goal norm in the TB family justifies NC, they would first owe us an
argument that, if there is any genuine norm in the TB family, then it invokes one of the
particular senses of possibility on which the mad scientist objection succeeds.
Mad scientist cases can be adapted to challenge goal norm-coherence requirement
pairs other than TB and NC. For instance, we can describe a mad scientist case in which
20Of course, there are ways of stating goal norms, and even of restating TB, that do not use the word ‘possible.’
What all goal norms must do is (explicitly or implicitly) specify the range of options from among which the
goal norm counts as ideal whichever is highest in the preference ordering. One common way of carrying out
this specification is an appeal to possibility, as found in my original statement of TB and the narrow-scope
restatement in Section I; in this case, the question of how the goal norm specifies the range of valid options
amounts to the question of how the use of ‘possible’ in the norm is to be understood. For simplicity, I will
sometimes speak of the ‘sense of possibility’ used in a goal norm as a proxy for the way in which we should
understand it as constraining the range of valid options, even in cases where the most natural statement of the
goal norm may not in fact use ‘possible.’
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one is offered a highly accurate credence function in exchange for a violation of Proba-
bilism, or a belief set that is exceptionally well supported by one’s evidence in exchange
for a violation of Deductive Consistency. One could be offered true beliefs about topics
with which one is particularly concerned, or the correction of false beliefs about objec-
tively important subjects. Essentially, whatever feature of a doxastic state is taken to be of
fundamental concern (epistemically speaking), we can describe a case in which the mad
scientist offers the means to achieve a doxastic state that does extremely well in terms of
that feature, if only one will violate some particular coherence requirement. There is noth-
ing about TB and NC in particular that makes them uniquely suitable for generating mad
scientist-type challenges.21 Nor must the mad scientist offer his reward in the form of an
improvement in your mental abilities; he might instead, for instance, offer you a great deal
of new evidence in exchange for violating a coherence requirement. However, any mad
scientist case will, like the original, require that whatever goal norm is being considered
uses a sense of possibility on which accepting the scientist’s offer results in a possible dox-
astic state, but there is no possible way of getting to a preferable state without accepting his
offer. Mad scientist cases are thus highly general in the sense that they do not depend for
their force on the specific content of the goal norm or coherence requirement to which they
apply, but highly specific in that they only apply to goal norms involving one of a narrowly
constrained range of forms of modality.22
In the discussion above, I considered only instances of mad scientist-like cases in
which the agent’s choice of doxastic states did not affect any of the truth values over which
21There is one limitation on the range of goal norm-coherence requirement pairs to which mad scientist cases
may be applied. The doxastic state required by the goal norm in question must depend on the agent?s circum-
stances — as, for instance, which belief set satisfies TB depends on which propositions are true, but which
credence function satisfies ADA does not.
22There is a special case in which the sense of possibility employed is irrelevant: that in which the goal
norm in question simply explicitly requires that one adopt a state satisfying some coherence requirement. For
instance, if the goal norm is a narrow-scope requirement that one adopt consistent beliefs, then no matter what
belief sets are considered possible, it will never be the case that the possible belief selected by the goal norm
is an inconsistent one. However, adopting such a goal norm is equivalent to abandoning the Instrumental
Thesis altogether; it is to claim that being coherent matters because of the final value of coherence, rather
than because of the instrumental relation between coherence and some other normative requirement.
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she was opinionated. Of course, strictly speaking, the doxastic state that one adopts is
always among the facts of the world; there are some propositions that have different truth
values depending on whether or not one accepts the mad scientist’s offer. Cases like Caie’s
exploit this fact. Let us now turn from considering cases like the mad scientist case, to
cases like Caie’s, and see how the insights yielded by the former carry over to the latter.
Caie’s case is meant to show that, while there are no circumstances in which satisfying
ADA requires violating Probabilism, there are circumstances in which satisfying CADA re-
quires violating Probabilism: namely, cases in which one is opinionated over certain sorts
of self-referential propositions. Joyce’s argument for Probabilism works by showing that,
for each logically possible Probabilism-violating credence function, there is a logically
possible Probabilism-satisfying function that is more accurate at every logically possible
world. Just as the number of true beliefs that one holds depends both on what one believes
and on what is true, one’s accuracy depends both on one’s credence function and on the
truth values of the propositions over which one is opinionated; that is, accuracy is a func-
tion of a pair consisting of a credence function and a truth value assignment (henceforth
TVA). Joyce tells us that for every Probabilism-violating function c, there is a Probabilism-
satisfying function c⇤ such that, for any TVA T , there is a possible pair of c⇤ and T that
receives a higher accuracy score than does the pair of c and T , with possible construed in
such a way that it applies to any pair of a logically possible credence function and logically
possible TVA.
In objecting to Joyce’s choice of ADA as the correct dominance-avoidance goal norm,
Caie is really objecting to Joyce’s implicit decision to adopt this particular sense of possi-
bility, for the purpose of specifying the comparison class that determines whether a given
function is non-dominated. In switching from ADA to CADA, Caie is essentially telling
us that the dominance-avoidance norm we should care about is one that treats as possible
only those pairs of a credence function and a TVA such that the TVA’s obtaining is consis-
tent with the agent in question actually adopting the credence function; that is, the possible
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credence function-TVA pairs are those pairs that are instantiated at metaphysically possi-
ble worlds. Caie’s constraint may not immediately seem suspect since it does not rule out
any metaphysically possible worlds, but it is in the first instance a constraint on credence
function-TVA pairs rather than on possible worlds, and it does importantly rule out a num-
ber of those pairs. Once we adopt a reading of the dominance-avoidance norm that uses
this sense of ‘possibility’ to pick out the relevant class of credence function-TVA pairs (by
requiring, not that there be no alternative function that is more accurate evaluated relative
to every possible world, but that there be no function that is more accurate evaluated rela-
tive to every TVA consistent with its adoption by the agent under consideration), Joyce’s
claim that any Probabilism-violating function is necessarily accuracy-dominated by some
Probabilism-satisfying function comes out false in just those cases Caie points to. We can
interpret CADA as a version of ADA modified to make use of this more restrictive sense of
possibility.23
As in the mad scientist cases, then, Caie’s ability to generate cases of conflict between
a goal norm and a coherence requirement depends on how he interprets the sense of possi-
bility at work in the goal norm. On the sense of possibility Joyce relies on, which credence
functions satisfy ADA for an agent is independent of that agent’s circumstances, and ev-
ery ADA-satisfying credence function is a Probabilism-satisfying one; it follows that there
are no circumstances in which ADA and Probabilism come into conflict. On some senses
of possibility more constrained then Caie’s, where it takes more for a credence function-
TVA pair to count as possible for an agent than for there to be some logically possible
23Rendering the requirements of CADA fully explicit, so as to show how it makes use of this sense of possi-
bility, is a somewhat complicated task. Where ADA requires that we adopt a credence function such that no
alternative is more accurate at every possible world, CADA requires that we adopt a credence function such
that no alternative function is guaranteed to be more accurate. Let us say that a function c⇤ is guaranteed to
be more accurate than c for agent A iff for every TVA T that obtains at at least one metaphysically possible
world whereA assigns c, 1) there is at least one metaphysically possible world where T obtains andA assigns
c⇤, and 2) the pair consisting of T and c⇤ is more accurate than the pair consisting of T and c. Whether a
credence function counts as ideal under CADA, then, depends not on the relative accuracy of all credence
function-TVA pairs that do and do not include that particular function, but rather on the relative accuracy of
the pairs that include the function and are instantiated at a metaphysically possible world, and the pairs that
don’t include a different function instead and are instantiated at a metaphysically possible world.
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world at which the agent adopts the function and the assignment obtains, the Probabilism-
violating credence functions he advocates would not count as possible. It is only by choos-
ing precisely the sense of possibility that he does, in which the set of possible credence
function-TVA pairs depends on an agent’s circumstances and some circumstances rule in
his preferred Probabilism-violating option while ruling out alternatives that are still more
accurate, that Caie is able to generate conflicts between Probabilism and accuracy domi-
nance avoidance.
This is not to say that Caie has made a mistake. Perhaps the sense of possibility that
he relies on is the sense at work in the most plausible accuracy dominance-avoidance norm.
My point at present is only that the success of Caie’s challenge to the Instrumental Thesis,
as applied to accuracy dominance and Probabilism, is contingent on the particular sense
of possibility that he builds into CADA. His argument should only convince us of a more
general failure of accuracy dominance arguments to justify probabilism if we independently
accept that the most plausible accuracy dominance-avoidance goal norm is one using this
sense of possibility.
As with mad scientist cases, though, the force of the Caie case does not depend es-
sentially on its application to an accuracy-based goal norm, or to Probabilism. Rather it
depends on his adopting a sense of possibility such that which doxastic state-TVA pairs
count as possible is in part a matter of the agent’s circumstances, and then specifying cir-
cumstances in which some Probabilism-violating function counts as possible while any
more accurate Probabilism-satisfying function (that is, any function higher in the prefer-
ence ordering established by ADA) counts as impossible. Once we choose a goal norm on
which the set of pairs of doxastic state and TVA that count as possible for an agent depends
on that agent’s circumstances, then we are in a position to try to construct a Caie-like case
of conflict between that goal norm and a given coherence requirement: simply stipulate
circumstances in which adopting some incoherent state brings about a state-TVA pair high
in the goal norm’s preference ordering, and any higher-ranked pairs of a coherent state and
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a TVA count as impossible (for instance, because the agent’s adopting the state is inconsis-
tent with the TVA’s holding).24 Mad scientist cases are really just the special case of this
phenomenon in which, since the TVA is held constant among all possible outcomes, we
may speak of the goal norm as treating doxastic states rather than state-TVA pairs as pos-
sible or impossible. In mad scientist cases only one TVA is possible, so a state is possible
iff the pair consisting of the one TVA and that state is possible.
24It is even possible to describe cases with much the same general structure as Caie’s, but that rely on causal
(rather than semantic) connections between the agent’s doxastic state and the TVA — for instance, cases
in which one’s high confidence that one will succeed in some undertaking makes it the case that one will
fail. See Greaves [2013] for discussion. Such cases have the advantage of greater real-world relevance than
Caie’s; nonetheless I have chosen to focus my discussion on cases involving self-referential propositions for
(relative) clarity of exposition.
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5 CONFLICT-IMMUNE GOAL NORMS
Suppose we accept that cases like those discussed in the previous two sections count
decisively against applying the Instrumental Thesis to at least some particular goal norm-
coherence requirement pairs: those in which the goal norm involves the wrong sort of
possibility. What then are we to say about that status of coherence requirements? One op-
tion is to deny that there are any genuine unconditional coherence requirements. A second
option is to maintain the existence of some such coherence requirements, but to deny that
they derive their force from goal norms in the manner described by the Instrumental Thesis.
These two possibilities will be considered in Section VI, below. The present section will
discuss a final possibility: that one or more unconditional coherence requirements derive
their force from an instrumental relation with goal norms not subject to cases of conflict
like those described above.
If we aim to vindicate both some unconditional coherence requirements and the In-
strumental Thesis, then we face the burden of coming up with some better goal norms, goal
norms that can be used to justify the coherence requirements to which we are committed
without giving rise to cases of conflict like those discussed in sections III and IV.
In and of itself, this is not actually such a difficult task. Indeed, we have already
come across one goal norm for which no such conflicts can arise: Joyce’s ADA. Remem-
ber, Caie’s objection to Joyce’s argument for Probabilism was not that ADA conflicts with
Probabilism, but rather that ADA is not a goal norm that we ought to be concerned with
in the first place. To make the general point more explicit: it is straightforwardly true that,
evaluated relative to any world, the logically possible belief set that will contain the most
truths and fewest falsehoods will be one that assigns belief to only propositions true at that
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world; assuming classical semantics, this belief set will satisfy NC. Similarly, it is the case
that, evaluated relative to any world, the most accurate of the logically possible credence
functions will be the Probabilism-satisfying credence function that assigns values of 1 to
all true propositions and all false propositions. In order to arrive at a truth-based goal norm
that will never come into conflict with NC, therefore, we must simply choose a norm that
requires us to adopt the belief set containing the most truths at our world, out of all logically
possible belief sets. We can arrive at an accuracy norm that will never conflict with Prob-
abilism by choosing one that requires us to adopt the credence function with the highest
accuracy, out of all logically possible credence functions.
These goal norms, however, aren’t what we’re looking for. For one thing, they es-
sentially require that rational agents be omniscient. There may be a perfectly good sort of
epistemic evaluation that we sometimes engage in, in which we are concerned only with
how close some agent comes to omniscience, and fault her for any false belief or less than
perfectly accurate credence. But one can be rational without being omniscient, and so the
observation that one must be coherent in order to be omniscient hardly amounts to an argu-
ment that one must be coherent in order to be rational. When we ask whether an agent is
believing rationally, we are asking whether she meets some standards short of being such
that there is no superior doxastic state that is metaphysically possible for her. Moreover,
Caie’s argument shows us that sometimes omniscience isn’t even metaphysically possi-
ble; certain truths just cannot be believed by certain agents (while retaining their status
as truths). So even were we otherwise disposed to think that requiring a rational agent to
believe all the truths is not too high a standard for rationality, we might hesitate to demand
that she do the metaphysically impossible.
The sort of evaluation that holds agents to standards tantamount to omniscience, more-
over, is not the kind underlying ordinary appeals to the Instrumental Thesis. Joyce, after
all, does not frame his argument for Probabilism by noting that if you had perfectly ac-
curate beliefs, you would also have probabilistically coherent beliefs, and therefore you
34
are defective if you violate Probabilism. If that were his point, there would be no need
to engage in a dominance-based argument in the first place. Instead, he explicitly argues
that rational agents will ‘hedge their bets’ by assigning non-extremal credences (which is
to say, credences that are not perfectly accurate in any possible world), and motivates the
case for Probabilism with the claim that a rational agent must adopt the state that ‘in her
best judgment’ will result in high accuracy.25 I think we should read Joyce as arguing
that an agent who violates Probabilism has failed to do the best, epistemically speaking,
that she is equipped to do. As we have seen, the argument runs into trouble because it re-
quires adopting a sense of possibility even more demanding than that underlying a demand
for omniscience; but in Joyce’s preference for an accuracy-dominance argument over an
accuracy-maximization argument, we can see his attempt to ground a standard of ratio-
nality in what is possible for an agent who is still capable of false beliefs and inaccurate
credence assignments.
The real challenge of specifying suitable goal norms, then, is not simply to come up
with norms that, if they hold, can support coherence requirements via the Instrumental
Thesis. We can do that anytime. Nor even is it to come up with goal norms that can do
the job and that are genuine parts of evaluative standpoints that we may, from time to time,
adopt; sometimes we really are simply in the business of judging how far an agent has
succeeded in believing truths. Instead, the hard problem is to come up with goal norms
that can support coherence requirements without abandoning their claim to capturing the
ordinary epistemic point of view from which we try to figure out the extent to which an
agent’s doxastic state counts as rational.
A promising strategy, I think, is to consider goal norms that constrain the range of
‘possible’ doxastic state-TVA pairs by excluding pairs that are instantiated (that is, the
state is held by the agent under evaluation, and the TVA obtains) only at worlds that are
in one way or another objectionable . . . for instance, worlds in which the agent’s doxastic
25Joyce [1998], p. 579.
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state was arrived at through certain prohibited processes. The intuitive idea here is that
while the goal of rational belief may be (for instance) to maximize the number of true
beliefs held, not just any way of acquiring true beliefs is a way of satisfying the goal
norm. Compare the game of checkers. The goal of a player in a checkers game is to
remove all of his opponent’s pieces from the board. However, this does not mean that one
can succeed at checkers just by reaching out and sweeping the opposing pieces onto the
floor at any time; rather, one must achieve the goal by way of the sorts of moves treated
as valid by the rules of the game.26 If there are restrictions on the causal histories of
worlds of instantiation that result in sets of state-TVA pairs for which conflicts between
goal norms and coherence requirements cannot be generated, then we can adopt goal norms
that maintain truth (or accuracy, or evidential fit, or whatever one’s preferred fundamental
epistemic value may be) as the goal of epistemic rationality, while also building in ground
rules such that violations of coherence requirements will never count as ‘winning moves.’
So we can acknowledge that accepting the mad scientist’s offer is a way of gaining true
beliefs, without being committed to the claim that it is also a way of satisfying (the best
version of) TB.
Note that this approach (in contrast to an alternative considered in Section VI below)
need not rely on the claim that, for instance, satisfying NC is constitutive of belief, or
satisfying Probabilism is constitutive of assigning credences. That is, we need not answer
the epistemic analog of the question: is the ‘checkers’ player who refuses to abide by the
rules, and knocks his opponent’s pieces to the floor, really playing checkers at all? We
can simply say: he is, at least, not playing checkers well. The rules are not built into
the definition of the activity, but instead into the evaluative standards that we use to judge
26One might object here that the goal of checkers is not, strictly speaking, to remove the opponent’s pieces
from the board, but rather to capture those pieces, and that no one would think that knocking them onto the
floor constitutes capturing them. But I think this is in fact precisely analogous to the epistemic situation. We
can describe the goals of checkers from an ‘external’ perspective (‘remove the pieces’) or from an ‘internal’
perspective, couching our description in the language of the game’s rules (‘capture the pieces’). The ‘captur-
ing’ description builds in the constraints on appropriate means. In soccer, we aim both to get the ball into the
goal, and to score goals. Similarly, we can describe a truth norm from an external perspective (‘maximize
true beliefs’) or an internal one (‘maximize true beliefs, in the acceptable ways’).
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success. We are free to admit that it may be possible to believe while violating NC, while
still denying that one can believe well, as evaluated from the ordinary epistemic point of
view, while violating NC.
What then might be the particular constraints that make up the ground rules for the
epistemic evaluative point of view? One possible response is that one should never assign
doxastic attitudes to propositions like Caie’s in the first place — tricky, self-referential
propositions to which it is metaphysically impossible (for a particular agent) ever to assign
true beliefs or perfectly accurate credences. Instead, the appropriate response in such cases
is to suspend judgment, believe neither the proposition nor its negation, refuse to assign
any credence, etc.
If you think this is the right response, you have it easy. Simply pick out any feature
of such propositions, and exclude from the range of possibilities considered by one’s goal
norm any state-TVA pair only instantiated at worlds in which one assigns a doxastic attitude
to such an objectionable proposition. If one then interprets the ‘possible’ in one’s goal norm
as applying to any state-TVA pair instantiated at any metaphysically possible world, except
the worlds just explicitly ruled out, then it will not be possible to generate Caie-like cases
of conflict between the goal norm and a given coherence requirement. But it will also not
be possible to generate mad scientist-type cases. Recall that such cases only work when the
sense of possibility used is one much more limited than metaphysical possibility, so that
the mad scientist can offer you a result that’s better than the best result possible through
any other means.27 The mad scientist, of course, can’t offer you a result better than the
best metaphysically possible one. So in modifying Caie’s preferred sort of possibility to
rule out Caie-like counterexamples, one blocks mad scientist counterexamples for free —
27I am assuming here that the goal norm and coherence requirement are such that whatever metaphysically
possible state best satisfies the goal norm, tricky Caie propositions excluded, is coherent. Strictly speaking,
that need not be the case: if we tried to use TB to justify Anti-NC, a coherence requirement satisfied only
if one has at least one pair of contradictory beliefs, then even if the mad scientist offered to bring about
the metaphysically best belief set-TVA pair, the one in which all and only the truths are believed, accepting
the offer would result in violating Anti-NC. But surely no one would have attempted to use TB and the
Instrumental Thesis to justify Anti-NC in the first place, and indeed I can think of no plausible application of
the Instrumental Thesis for which the assumption I make here fails.
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though one still faces the objection that the sense of possibility in play here, without further
modification, leads to overly demanding goal norms, even if they are able to avoid conflict
with coherence requirements. In most cases, goal norms using this sort of possibility will
make precisely the same demands as goal norms that require rational agents to adopt the
best metaphysically possible doxastic state, so much of the reason for resisting those goal
norms will carry over.
If, on the other hand, one does not think that all worlds in which one is opinionated
over Caie-like self referential propositions can simply be ruled out ex ante, then matters
are somewhat more complicated. We can still identify other senses of possibility that block
both the Caie- and mad scientist-type cases so far considered. Recall that the original
mad scientist case depends for its force on treating the state that results from accepting the
scientist’s offer as possible, but treating the state containing all the same beliefs that one
could deduce with the help of the scientist’s drug, but not containing the false belief about
the number seven required in order to convince him to give you the drug in the first place,
as impossible. If we adopt a version of TB that violates either one of these criteria — that
either treats the scientist’s offered state as impossible, or the slightly-better state as possible
— then the case will not be an instance of conflict between NC and TB.
Of course, there’s more than one way of ending up with a given belief set. One way
of ending up with the slightly-better set of beliefs is by simply guessing, and getting very
lucky. After all, even without the mad scientist’s aid, there’s nothing stopping you from
holding those particular beliefs that just happen to be the ones he would help you arrive
at. It seems plausible enough that a belief set should not count as the one that you ought
rationally to adopt just in virtue of the fact that if you happened to adopt it by guessing,
you would end up with lots of true beliefs — if it did, then at least in cases not involving
Caie-like self-referential propositions, one would be rationally required by TB not to hold
any false beliefs, on the grounds that it’s possible to arrive at a belief set containing only
truths by guessing. On the other hand, one might also arrive at the same belief set (the
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one slightly better than what the mad scientist offers) by deducing its contents without the
aid of the scientist’s drug. Of course, one’s deductive abilities might in fact be sufficiently
limited that one is not able to deduce one’s way to that belief set, but it does not seem so
perverse for a standard of rationality to say that one ought to do so, as for it to say that one
ought to simply guess one’s way to the truth.
Call a world in which you accept the mad scientist’s offer a ‘cheating world,’ a world
in which you arrive at a belief set by guessing a ‘guessing world,’ and one where you ar-
rive at a belief set by working out what follows from your evidence a ‘deducing world.’
The mad scientist case treats as possible the state-TVA pair instantiated in the one cheating
world, and the pairs instantiated in a subset of the deducing worlds — those worlds involv-
ing only the deduction that one is actually capable of carrying out. It rules out all state-TVA
pairs only instantiated in guessing worlds, which as noted above, seems like a good thing.
One way of defeating the mad scientist case is to simply adopt a sense of possibility that
rules out the cheating world, and thereby the belief set offered by the scientist, while oth-
erwise allowing the same set of possibilities assumed by the case. But this seems like an
insufficiently demanding standard of rationality, since it says that you ought only believe
as many truths as you yourself are capable of reasoning your way to, no matter how bad a
reasoner you may be. A different way of blocking the mad scientist case is to adopt a sense
of possibility that may or may not include the state-TVA pair instantiated in the cheating
world, but that does include those pairs instantiated at any deducing world (or at least at a
large enough subset of those worlds to include at least one pair that TB ranks ahead of that
instantiated in the cheating world).
Intuitively, this option responds to the mad scientist case by saying: it may well be
better to accept the scientist’s offer than to remain as ignorant as you currently are. But
neither is what you ought to do. What rationality demands of you is that you work out for
yourself what follows from your evidence, just as you would do if you accepted the mad
scientist’s offer, but without holding contradictory beliefs about whether seven is a prime
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in the process. It is unfortunate if you are not able to reason so well as rationality demands,
but it is no strike against a norm’s counting as a standard of rationality that it requires good
reasoning.
A version of TB that can require a particular belief set in virtue of the fact that the be-
liefs contained in it can in principle be arrived at through perfect deduction will never give
rise to the particular sort of mad scientist case in which the scientist offers an improvement
in one’s deductive capabilities, because a change in an agent’s actual deductive capabilities
will never result, given this goal norm, in a different state’s counting as ideal. So long as
‘deducing worlds’ include only those that can be arrived at by strictly deductive reasoning,
moreover, this version of TB is immune to Caie-type cases. While it might be possible
to deduce in a Caie-type case that adopting inconsistent beliefs will maximize the number
of truths and minimize the number of falsehoods believed, it will not be possible, or any
particular proposition p, to deduce both p and ¬p. So although in a Caie-type case an agent
might be aware that there is some metaphysically possible world in which she would hold
more true beliefs in virtue of violating NC, it does not follow that violating NC is required
by the version of TB under consideration.
Of course, deductive reasoning is not the only form of good reasoning, and it is plau-
sible that the best version of TB, or any other goal norm, may sometimes require doxastic
states that can be arrived at through good reasoning but not deductive reasoning alone. De-
pending on how inclusive an understanding of good reasoning one favors, it may be the
case that a goal norm using a sense of possibility that ranges over all state-TVA pairs that
one can arrive at through good reasoning will sometimes fall prey to Caie cases. To avoid
this result, it must (at least) be the case that the inference from ‘I would have more true be-
liefs if I believed p’ to ‘p’ does not count as good reasoning. This seems like a reasonable
constraint.28
28See Berker [2013] for discussion of other disadvantages of goal norms that do not include some such con-
straint, beyond their difficulties in accounting for coherence requirements (though Berker’s target is goal-
or value-based approaches in epistemology, of which the Instrumental Thesis is one, rather than those goal
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The strategy I have been discussing, which responds to the original mad scientist case
by requiring that agents adopt the best doxastic state that can be arrived at through good
reasoning, is still potentially threatened by other variants of the mad scientist case. For in-
stance, we might construct a case in which, rather than administering a drug that improves
deductive capacities, the scientist simply rewards coherence-violating agents with a great
deal of new evidence, from which they are able to reason using their ordinary deductive
capacities. In some cases, it might be tempting to say that a rational agent ought to obtain
for herself the evidence offered by the mad scientist, but this surely cannot be an appro-
priate demand in every case — that is, unlike in the original case, we cannot respond by
saying simply that a rational agent ought to refuse the scientist’s offer, but nevertheless end
up working out all the true beliefs that he offers on her own. The only response consistent
with our earlier strategy, therefore, is to exclude accepting the scientist’s offer in a new-
evidence case from the range of possibilities that may be required by TB. This will be an
unacceptable result for anyone who judges that a rational agent ought to believe a contra-
diction in order to gain access to the scientist’s new evidence, but that is a judgment I do
not share. I am therefore happy to maintain that the sense of ‘possible’ at work in genuine
goal norms will range over state-TVA pairs only instantiated in worlds resulting from an
agent’s carrying out excellent reasoning, but not pairs resulting from the agent’s acquiring
new evidence by any means necessary.
I have not, admittedly, provided a fully specified account or defense of a particular
sense of possibility that is most appropriately read into epistemic goal norms. What I have
done is to show what constraints the chosen sense of possibility must impose in order to
block certain types of counterexamples; show that some senses of possibility that excel
at blocking the entire range of counterexamples are nonetheless implausible because the
standards to which we hold rational agents, should we adopt goal norms that make use of
them, are either to strict or too lax; and argue that senses of possibility that count state-TVA
norms in particular); and for some plausible suggestions about the boundary between what I term good rea-
soning and cheating.
41
pairs as possible or impossible based on the features of the worlds in which they are instan-
tiated block at least a wide range of counterexamples while also maintaining intuitively
plausible goal norms. I think that such an approach offers an appealing strategy for saving
the Instrumental Thesis without either abandoning unconditional coherence requirements
or adopting wholly implausible goal norms. The details of an argument from a particular
goal norm to a particular coherence requirement must still be filled in, but when such an
argument is offered, an appropriate construal of the sense of possibility used in the goal
norm may serve to save the argument from apparent counterexamples.
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6 ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE
If we do not accept that there are instances of genuine goal norms instrumentally
justifying unconditional coherence requirements — if, that is, we are persuaded by the
challenges described in Section III, but not by the response in Section V — then we face
a choice between two alternatives. We may deny that there are any genuine, unconditional
coherence requirements; or we may maintain the existence of such requirements, but deny
that the Instrumental Thesis offers the correct account of their force. In this final section, I
consider the merits of these responses to the problem.
Should we deny that there are any unconditional coherence requirements? The chal-
lenge described above exerts some pressure in this direction; we have seen that a number
of seemingly promising attempts to justify particular such requirements using the Instru-
mental Thesis fail. For readers who were not particularly committed to the existence of
genuine coherence requirements to begin with, this challenge may be sufficient, if not to
conclusively rule out the possibility of such coherence requirements, then at least to place
the burden of proof firmly on the shoulders of those who think they have a solid positive
argument with which to establish some particular coherence requirement.
Others will maintain a commitment to coherence requirements, and continue to hope
for arguments capable of validating them. I count myself in this latter camp, the members
of which may still disagree over which particular requirements are supposed to obtain. For
myself, it is difficult to shake the sense that there are some grounds for faulting any agent
who violates either NC or Probabilism (which is not to say that such violations might not
be all-things-considered justified).
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A skeptic about unconditional coherence requirements will find it easy enough to ex-
plain away this intuition of mine. After all, they can readily enough agree that there are
many instances in which violating NC or Probabilism is criticizable. The cases of conflict
I have discussed above are hardly ordinary; most of us neither encounter contradiction-
loving mad scientists nor consider tricky self-referential propositions on a regular basis. So
the skeptic might argue that apparent coherence requirements are in fact useful heuristics,
which get us the right answer (say, by helping us satisfy a goal norm) when applied in most
ordinary circumstances, but that potentially lead us astray in the sort of bizarre case that
troublesome philosophers can dream up. Or there might be genuine norms of coherence
with independent force, which when properly interpreted simply do not require that one
be coherent under all possible circumstances. Or yet it might be the case that coherent
doxastic states are a typical, though not constant, byproduct of satisfying distinct norms;
for instance, it might be the case that if we reason successfully based on our evidence, the
end result will typically be a coherent state.29 Any of these states of affairs might trick our
intuitions into perceiving any coherence violation as objectionable, as we overgeneralize
from ordinary cases.
I do not deny that this is a live possibility. I can only report that, presented with the
possibility, I am not immediately won over, but remain invested in trying to see whether
there is any plausible way in which unconditional coherence requirements might be saved.
Coherence requirements seem real, and so it is worth finding out whether they might be
real. If no plausible account of them can be found, then perhaps falling back on this error
theory will be the only reasonable response, but if some plausible account can be given then
while it still might be that my intuition is in error, there will hardly be conclusive reason to
reject it.
An alternative possibility, then, is that there are genuine, unconditional coherence
requirements, but that they do not in fact derive their force from goal norms in the manner
29See Kolodny [2007].
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described by the Instrumental Thesis. This possibility is consistent either with there being
no genuine goal norms, or with goal norms and coherence requirements coexisting without
the satisfaction of either standing in an instrumental relation to that of the other.
Suppose we conclude that there are no genuine goal norms, but that there are coher-
ence requirements.30 In carrying out epistemic evaluation of doxastic states, both our own
and those of others, we would then consider whether those states were coherent in certain
ways, that is, whether they instantiated certain patterns. We might also evaluate whether
those attitudes satisfied some assortment of narrow-scope requirements other than goal
norms; for instance, certain beliefs might simply be mandated for any agent in a particular
evidential situation. But none of these requirements would hold in virtue of their relation-
ship to a more fundamental norm expressing an epistemic goal, such as the promotion of
true belief.
It would be difficult to recognize the evaluative standpoint just described as an epis-
temic one, or at least as our ordinary epistemic perspective. When we ask whether some
doxastic attitude is epistemically required, or prohibited, we are typically not just asking
whether there is some evaluative standpoint that yields such a verdict. After all, beliefs
may well be required or prohibited from a prudential or moral point of view, but realiz-
ing that they are does nothing to answer the question of whether or not it is epistemically
appropriate to hold them. Similarly, the fact that there is a possible evaluative standpoint
that privileges coherence while not being at all concerned with the promotion of true belief
does not mean that any such standpoint is among those we are concerned with when we ask
whether coherence is epistemically required. Recall Alston’s claim, quoted in Section II,
that the epistemic point of view is defined by the aim of maximizing truth and minimizing
30Is this possible? Perhaps any coherence requirement entails a norm that technically satisfies my definition
of a goal norm. For instance, if NC is true, then plausibly the following is also true: “If one is a rational
agent, then one ought to satisfy NC.” If you think that such a goal norm does follow from NC, then simply
take the view under consideration to be one on which there are no genuine norms reflecting epistemic goals
other than coherence.
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falsity in a body of beliefs. We may be more liberal than Alston, and allow that a some-
what wider range of goals might define points of view worthy of being called ‘epistemic,’
without thereby being required to place a viewpoint that involves no goal beyond formal
coherence itself as on a level footing with those others.
In more concrete terms, what would be unsatisfactory about such an evaluative stand-
point? Well, one advantage of tracing the force to coherence requirements to that of goal
norms is that we can hope to provide a unified account of the force of multiple coherence
requirements, rather than stipulating the importance of each in an ad hoc manner. NC and
Probabilism, although applied to different doxastic attitudes, bear a strong resemblance
to each other; each entails, for instance, that one should not be highly confident in the
truth of inconsistent propositions. If the goal norm that justifies NC specifies the right way
of promoting the truth for full beliefs, and the goal that justifies Probabilism analogously
specifies the right way of promoting the truth for credences, then it is unsurprising that
similar coherence requirements hold in each domain. If on the other hand one wanted to
hold on to both NC and Probabilism while denying the existence of any goal norms, then
their similarity would, implausibly, seem to be a matter of pure coincidence.
One strategy for attempting to explain the force of coherence requirements in the ab-
sence of goal norms is to claim that these requirements are somehow constitutive of the
attitudes to which they apply: for instance, NC is somehow constitutive of what it is for a
mental state to be a belief, as opposed to say a supposition. This strategy, however, faces
significant challenges. It would be relatively straightforward to claim that it is constitu-
tive of beliefs that they must satisfy NC; that is, to deny that any two mental states, held
by the same person at the same time, with contradictory contents are really beliefs. The
claim might perhaps be rendered more plausible by amending it to state that one cannot
knowingly or intentionally hold contradictory beliefs. But while all of these claims could
account for the difficulty or impossibility of some ways of violating NC, they would not
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say what is wrong with violating NC, should one manage to do so. A different sort of con-
stitutive claim could indeed explain what is wrong with violating NC: the claim that it is
constitutive of a mental state’s being a belief that the state ought to satisfy NC, whether or
not it actually does. But this approach runs into its own difficulties. Suppose that we are
considering two mental states, each of which satisfy all the non-normative requirements
to count as a belief. Indeed, the two states are identical except that one ought to satisfy
NC, and therefore counts as a belief, while the other does not. Then learning that beliefs
ought to satisfy NC is of no use whatsoever in figuring out which of these states ought to
satisfy NC— we can only apply NC once we know which state is a belief, but we can only
figure out which state is a belief by first figuring out which ought to satisfy NC. (If on the
other hand there is always a non-normative as well as a normative one between beliefs and
non-beliefs, then why not think it is the non-normative difference that determines which
are beliefs?) This does not rule out the possibility that beliefs are constituted by the norms
they ought to satisfy, but I think it does show that if beliefs are so constituted then it is a
mistake to use terms like ‘belief’ to pick out the things to which norms apply.
Even should we overcome these difficulties sufficiently to pursue one of the constitu-
tive strategies for justifying coherence norms, we might still ask whether such a strategy
can plausibly deliver NC or Probabilism in particular. If it is to do so, I think the strategy we
adopt must allow that it is at least sometimes possible for an agent to be in the state despite
knowingly flouting the coherence requirement. For instance, it seems perfectly coherent
to imagine an agent knowingly assigning a Probabilism-violating credence function, under
the (perhaps false) belief that doing so was the best way of promoting accuracy. While I
have some sympathy, for instance, for the claim that an agent who is utterly unconcerned
with her accuracy doesn’t count as assigning credences, the same simply doesn’t seem true
of an agent who is utterly unconcerned with her probabilistic coherence (except insofar as
the violation of Probabilism foreseeably results in worse accuracy, but here we are consid-
ering the appropriate verdict on the assumption that no accuracy goal norm holds). Thus
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I am more open to a strategy which takes aiming at accuracy or truth to be constitutive
of doxastic states, than one which directly takes coherence to be so constitutive; but then
we return to the difficulties, familiar from the earlier sections of this paper, for justifying
coherence requirements in terms of their ability to promote truth or accuracy.
What if, rather than denying the existence of genuine goal norms, we suppose that
there are some such goal norms, along with some coherence requirements, but that neither
derives its force from the other? Denying that one derives its force from the other, of course,
does nothing to prevent conflicts between them. So adopting an evaluative perspective ac-
cording to which we are independently concerned with, say, satisfying both of Probabilism
and CADA means there that the cases of conflict presented earlier will, rather than under-
mining the force of the coherence requirement, simply result in a dilemma in which we are
genuinely caught between two constraints that cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Perhaps
this is our epistemic position: being coherent and avoiding accuracy dominance are both
important, but you can’t always do both at once.
However, this mere addition of independent goal norms does nothing at all to account
for the force of the coherence requirements, or to explain the similarities between the coher-
ence requirements that seem plausibly to be applied to different sorts of doxastic attitudes.
Moreover, it is hardly a silver bullet for our concern about locating coherence requirements
within the ordinary epistemic perspective. While the result will be an evaluative standpoint
that is concerned, in part, with the promotion of truth, it will also be the case that some
doxastic attitudes will be required for reasons entirely independent of their truth, or pro-
hibited for reasons independent of their falsehood. That is, while this sort of evaluative
point of view is one which will endorse some doxastic attitudes for truth-related reasons,
it may also endorse others for reasons that are entirely a matter of coherence. Perhaps this
degree of concern with the truth is sufficient that we might accept the strategy in question as
consistent with our ordinary epistemic point of view, but perhaps not. Finally, this strategy
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raises the question of whether there is any principled way of weighing coherence require-
ments against goal norms, or whether there are simply cases in which the two come into
irresolvable conflict. A version of this strategy on which coherence requirements take lex-
ical priority over goal norms might deliver much the same result as my preferred approach
as outlined in Section V, on which coherence requirements derive their force from their
status as a means to satisfying a (suitably restricted) truth or accuracy goal norm; however,
it would lack the resources to justify the coherence requirements in instrumental terms. On
the whole then, I think that my approach remains a more appealing option, so long as we
can identify constraints that might be built into the goal norms that are sufficient to avoid
cases of conflict with coherence requirements, without themselves being too alien to our
ordinary epistemic point of view.
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